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We conduct a series of four laboratory experiments and interviews with senior tax professionals 
to study biases in tax decisions. In our experiments with 303 students and 62 experienced tax 
professionals, we find a systematic tax-rate bias in decisions under time constraints. 
Specifically, decision-makers overestimate the relevance of less complex tax-rate information 
compared to more complex tax-base information. This behavior leads to suboptimal decision-
making. Moreover, we find that decision-making is unaffected by professional experience: 
students and tax professionals are similarly prone to tax-rate bias. Yet, tax professionals in 
senior positions are more rationally inattentive. These decision-makers are less likely to exhibit 
a tax-rate bias when exhibiting such bias is relatively costly. In-depth interviews with senior 
tax professionals corroborate the external validity of these results. Overall, our findings suggest 
that resource constraints impede the use of complex information, which results in suboptimal 
tax decisions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates biases in decisions with tax implications (tax decisions). The financial 
consequences of a tax decision typically depend on the tax rate and the tax base. Standard 
economic theory assumes that decision-makers consider all relevant tax parameters and make 
economically optimal decisions (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, and Shevlin 
2014) that reflect tax-rate effects and tax-base effects alike (Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme 
2008; Newberry and Dhaliwal 2000; Hines and Rice 1994). However, a growing body of 
research suggests that tax decisions might deviate from this theoretical prediction. Prior work 
on the use of tax-rate information in financial decisions, for instance, finds that decision-
makers overestimate average tax rates relative to marginal tax rates (Powers, Schmidt, 
Seidman, and Stomberg 2017; Bartolome 1995), which can lead to suboptimal outcomes at 
the firm level (Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 2017). While these findings suggest that 
decision biases affect the evaluation of tax-rate information, prior work does not investigate 
whether decision-makers evaluate tax-rate effects and tax-base effects differently. Moreover, 
the drivers of biases in tax decisions remain largely unknown. To fill this void, we study 
whether and under which conditions decision-makers exhibit a systematic bias when 
evaluating tax-rate information and tax-base information. 
Understanding the behavioral dimension of tax decisions is important for policy 
makers. Changing tax rates and tax bases are the main channels for tax-policy reform (Simons 
1938; Haig 1921) and lowering statutory tax rates while broadening the tax base is a popular 
policy tool (Alm 2018; OECD 2010). For instance, the 2017 U.S. tax reform (“Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act”) lowered statutory tax rates for corporations and individuals. These tax-rate cuts 
were supplemented with elements of base broadening both on the corporate side (e.g., 
limitation of interest deductibility) and on the individual side (e.g., elimination of personal 
exemptions and several itemized deductions) (Duquette 2019). More broadly, between 2000 
and 2017, the average statutory corporate tax rate in the OECD fell from 32.3 percent to 24.6 
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percent but corporate tax revenues remained constant at 9.3 percent of GDP (OECD 2020). 
This raises the question how decision-makers respond to changes in the tax base relative to 
changes in tax rates. Specifically, it remains unclear whether systematic biases in the 
evaluation of tax-rate effects and tax-base effects influence taxpayers’ responses to these 
reforms. A better understanding of the behavioral dimension of tax decisions therefore 
informs the policy debate.  
Identifying biases in tax decisions is also important for corporate decision-makers 
and investors. For example, in a tax-planning decision, tax-base effects could diminish the 
benefits associated with preferential tax-rate effects. Overestimating the importance of either 
tax-rate effects or tax-base effects could likely result in suboptimal tax outcomes. Hence, 
biases in tax decisions might contribute to observed heterogeneity in firms’ tax payments 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008). 
Indeed, prior research provides some initial indication that individuals might 
underestimate the financial implications of tax-base effects. Blaufus, Bob, Hundsdoerfer, 
Kiesewetter, and Weimann (2013) find that non-experts tend to underestimate the perceived 
tax burden of tax-base changes when choosing between stylized tax systems. However, since 
Blaufus et al. (2013) find that learning effects diminish decision biases, it is unclear to what 
extent, if at all, this result extends to tax professionals who repeatedly make tax decisions. In 
sum, it remains largely unknown whether, why, and under which conditions decision-makers 
evaluate tax-rate effects or tax-base effects differently. 
In a decision where tax-rate effects and tax-base effects determine the optimal 
choice, the economic effects of tax rates are more intuitive and simpler to identify than the 
economic effects of the tax base. For instance, more operations are required to quantify the 
economic consequences of a change in the tax base than to quantify the effect of a change in 
the tax rate. Such relative differences in complexity might be relevant in tax decisions where 
decision-makers have to evaluate large amounts of information in a short time. Indeed, a 
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survey of 74 highly experienced tax professionals indicates a high prevalence of resource 
constraints, and particularly a high prevalence of severe time constraints, in real-world tax 
decisions, which raises the question of whether tax-rate effects and tax-base effects receive 
equal attention in these decisions.1 
When confronted with resource constraints, decision-makers might be unable to 
carefully analyze all relevant information and use simplifying decision strategies known as 
heuristics. Heuristics alleviate the complexity of a task, reduce its cognitive load (Kahneman 
2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1974), and thereby diminish the information-processing costs 
of the decision-maker (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). For instance, decision-makers 
might base their decisions on information that is easy to process (Weenig and Maarleveld 
2002; Edland and Swenson 1993), such as information on tax rates. However, overweighing 
tax-rate effects relative to tax-base effects could result in suboptimal choices. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that tax decisions under resource constraints are subject to a tax-rate bias that 
lowers the quality of these decisions. Consistent with the theory of rational inattention, which 
predicts that decision-makers ignore information that has only a marginal effect on the 
outcome of a decision (Gabaix 2014; Mackowiak and Wiederholt 2009; Sims 2003), we 
expect that a large tax-base effect mitigates the tax-rate bias. That is, decision-makers should 
be more likely to allocate their inattention rationally, and hence consider complex tax-base 
information in their decisions more carefully, if ignoring this information appears costly. 
To test these predictions, we run a series of four laboratory experiments with 
students and tax professionals. An experimental approach allows us to isolate causal effects 
and to determine the relevance of factors that are otherwise unobservable (Alm and Jacobson 
2007). We design a decision scenario where participants must choose the form of financing 
(i.e., equity or debt capital) that minimizes the overall tax burden of a firm. We model tax-rate 
 
1 We provide details on our survey of tax professionals in Section 2.  
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effects through changes in statutory tax rates, and tax-base effects through changes in the tax 
loss carry-forward. To rule out anchoring effects and status-quo bias (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1974), the tax decisions are presented to the 
participants in random order. To account for resource constraints in tax decisions, we include 
a time-constraints treatment in which we limit the time per decision. Following our survey 
results, this treatment is designed such that it reflects the time constraints faced by tax 
professionals in real-world tax decisions.2  
In our first experiment, which includes 185 students, we find that decision-makers do 
not consistently identify the tax-minimizing option, but they consider tax-rate effects and tax-
base effects in their decisions. Under time constraints, however, decision-makers exhibit a 
tax-rate bias. Specifically, participants systematically overestimate tax-rate effects while 
underestimating the economic consequences of the tax base. This behavior results in 
suboptimal decision-making. We also find that a large tax-base effect mitigates the decision 
bias, which indicates a tendency for rational inattention in tax decisions.  
We repeat our initial experiment with 62 experienced tax professionals who regularly 
prepare and/or make tax decisions. This second experiment investigates whether tax 
professionals behave differently from students and whether a lack of experience might explain 
our results.3 On average, individuals in the professional sample exhibit more than 10 years of 
experience. Our results indicate that decision-making under time constraints is unaffected by 
the level of professional experience and that students and tax professionals are equally prone 
to tax-rate bias. These results suggest that professional experience, or a lack thereof, does not 
affect decision-makers’ propensity to overestimate simple tax-rate information. However, in 
 
2 Interviews with eight highly experienced tax professionals suggest that our time-constraints treatment reflects 
the decision environment of real-world tax decisions. In particular, the interviews reveal that tax professionals 
often face severe time constraints, which does not allow a careful analysis of all relevant information (Section 6).  
3 While prior work shows that student decision-making does not systematically deviate from that of professionals 
(Depositario, Nayga, Wu, and Laude 2009; Elliot, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk 2007; Liyanarachchi 2007; Remus 
1996; Ashton and Kramer 1980), recent evidence suggests that students behave even more rationally than non-
students in laboratory experiments (Belot, Duch, and Miller 2015). 
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contrast to their junior colleagues and students, we find that tax professionals in senior 
positions exhibit a strong tendency to be rationally inattentive. In other words, senior tax 
professionals are less likely to exhibit a tax-rate bias when the tax-base effect has a 
meaningful effect on the tax burden, i.e., when exhibiting a tax-rate bias would be costly. 
We conduct two additional experiments to address alternative explanations for these 
results. First, we permute the tax-minimizing form of financing for each tax decision and 
show that unobserved preferences for equity or debt financing do not explain our findings. 
Second, we change the order of the relevant tax parameters and provide information on the 
tax base before showing the tax rates. We continue to find that decision-makers overestimate 
tax-rate effects while underestimating the economic consequences of the tax base. 
Finally, to address potential concerns about the validity of our experimental design 
and to better understand the effect of resource constraints on real-world tax decisions, we 
conduct in-depth interviews with eight highly experienced tax professionals. The interviews 
support the validity of our experimental design, by emphasizing that resource constraints, and 
in particular time constraints, are prevalent in tax decisions that resemble the decision context 
in our experiments. Moreover, the interviews suggest that time constraints prevent decision-
makers from carefully analyzing all relevant information, which facilitates the use of 
heuristics in real-world tax decisions. In particular, time constraints prompt senior tax 
professionals to put more emphasis on information that is easy to process. Tax professionals 
are also less likely to consider complex information if the financial stakes are low, which 
indicates rational inattention. As a result, real-world tax decisions are often “good enough” 
rather than “perfect”. These results corroborate the external validity of our findings and 
suggest that our experiments capture a fundamental mechanism of real-world tax decisions.  
Our findings add to several streams of research. First, we expand research on the 
processing and relevance of tax-related information. Prior studies investigate how different 
types of tax rates affect tax decisions (Graham et al. 2017; Powers et al. 2017), but do not 
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examine whether decision-makers evaluate tax-rate effects and tax-base effects differently. 
Our results suggest that decision-makers reduce information-processing costs by weighing 
relatively simple information on tax rates more strongly than more complex information on 
tax bases. This behavior leads to a systematic decision bias (tax-rate bias) in situations where 
resources for decision-making are limited. Extending prior work by Blaufus et al. (2013), we 
show that lack of professional experience does not explain biased decision-making. 
Second, we contribute to research on rational inattention (Gabaix 2014; Mackowiak 
and Wiederholt 2009; Sims 2003). While Abeler and Jaeger (2015) find no evidence for 
rational inattention in a tax-complexity experiment, we document that the propensity to make 
a biased tax decision is affected by the size of the relevant tax parameters. Specifically, our 
results indicate that decision-makers are more likely to underestimate the importance of tax-
base effects that do not have a meaningful effect on the tax burden. We also show that the 
ability to allocate inattention rationally is stronger among senior tax professionals.  
Third, our findings inform the discussion about the adequacy of student samples in 
laboratory experiments (Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee 2015; Belot et al., 2015; Bloomquist 
2009; Alm and Jacobson 2007). Unlike most prior work, we study experimentally the 
decisions of highly experienced tax professionals, rather than investigating their 
recommendations or evaluations.4 We find that despite incentivizing economically optimal 
decision-making, students and tax professionals with substantial experience exhibit the same 
systematic decision bias. This result suggests that students could be valid surrogates in 
experiments that investigate real-world tax decisions. Our study might therefore encourage 
future experimental research in this area.  
 
4 Most prior studies use scenario designs and investigate recommendations (Vermeer, Spilker, and Curatola 2020; 
Magro 2005) or hypothetical decisions (Hansen 2020; Hansen, Jackson, Schaefer, and Stewart 2018) rather than 
actual decisions. In contrast to our study, these studies also do not employ incentive mechanisms. In sum, prior 
studies examine “stated preferences” while our study examines “revealed preferences”, i.e., the actual decision-
making of tax professionals under controlled experimental conditions (Charness, Gneezy, and Imas 2013).  
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Tax-Rate Effects and Tax-Base Effects in Tax Decisions 
The outcome of a tax decision is determined by two factors: (i) the tax rate (tax-rate 
effect) and (ii) the tax base (tax-base effect). Taxpayers, and corporate taxpayers in particular, 
can exploit differences in tax rates and tax bases in order to reduce their tax burden. For 
example, a firm could use intra-group debt financing to shift income from high-tax countries 
to low-tax countries (Heckemeyer and Overesch 2017; Overesch and Wamser 2014; Huizinga 
et al. 2008; Ramb and Weichenrieder 2005; Desai, Foley, and Hines 2004). Similarly, a firm 
could aim at reporting profits in countries with preferential tax-base effects, such as the 
opportunity to carry tax losses forward in time (Newberry and Dhaliwal 2000).  
Tax-base effects, however, may diminish the benefits associated with tax-rate effects. 
Intra-group debt financing, for example, is deemed beneficial if the financed entity is located 
in a high-tax country and the financing entity is located in a low-tax country. However, debt 
financing is no longer beneficial if the tax benefit at the financed entity does not materialize 
due to a tax loss carry-forward and if, at the same time, tax is due on the interest income of 
the financing entity. Thus, underestimating the effect of the tax rate or the tax loss carry-
forward might result in suboptimal tax-planning outcomes. 
We model the trade-off between tax-rate effects (i.e., differences in statutory tax 
rates) and tax-base effects (i.e., a tax loss carry-forward) in an intra-group financing decision, 
assuming economically optimal decision-making.5 Consider parent company 𝐴 and its foreign 
subsidiary 𝐵. The firms earn 𝜋𝐴 and 𝜋𝐵, which is the taxable income of A and B before 
deducting interest payments on intra-group debt and a tax loss carry-forward. The tax base 
 
5 We assume that minimizing the tax burden is equivalent to an economically optimal outcome. We therefore use 
both terms interchangeably but acknowledge that, in reality, tax-minimizing behavior does not necessarily lead to 
an economically optimal result. Firms differ in their financial reporting costs of tax planning (Frank, Lynch, and 
Rego 2009; Badertscher, Philips, Pinco, and Rego 2009), regulatory costs of tax planning (Mills, Nutter, and 
Schwab 2013), or reputational costs of tax planning (Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock 2014). These aspects 
imply different optimal levels of tax planning across firms. We abstract from these aspects in our study.  
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after deducting interest payments and a tax loss carry-forward is taxable at the statutory tax 
rates 𝜏𝐴 and 𝜏𝐵, respectively. To limit our analysis to the trade-off between tax-rate effects 
and tax-base effects, we assume that 𝜏𝑏 > 𝜏𝑎, which implies a positive tax-rate differential 
between the subsidiary and the parent company.  
𝐴 can finance 𝐵 via intra-group equity or debt. 𝐴 is risk neutral and has no 
preference for either form of financing. If 𝐴 chooses equity financing, dividends are neither 
tax deductible at 𝐵 nor taxable at 𝐴. If 𝐵 is financed via debt, interest payments 𝐼 are tax 
deductible at 𝐵 and taxed at 𝐴. In a one-period setting, 𝐴 selects the tax-planning strategy 
yielding the lowest group tax burden. 
First, the group tax burden under equity financing (𝑇𝐸) is given by 
𝑇𝐸 = 𝜋𝑎𝜏𝑎 + (𝜋𝑏 − 𝐿𝑏) 𝜏𝑏, (1) 
where 𝐿𝑏 denotes the amount of tax loss carry-forward from prior years available at 
𝐵, which is equal to or less than 𝜋𝑏. To focus on a single tax-base effect, we assume that any 
unused tax loss carry-forward will be forfeited in later periods. 
Second, the group tax burden under debt financing (𝑇𝐷) is given by 
𝑇𝐷 = (𝜋𝑎 + 𝐼) 𝜏𝑎 + (𝜋𝑏 − 𝐼 − 𝜃𝐿𝑏) 𝜏𝑏, (2) 
where 𝐼  indicates interest payments on intra-group debt. 𝜃  is defined as 
𝜋𝑏−𝐼
𝐿𝑏
  and 
denotes the fraction of 𝐿𝑏, which can be offset against taxable income after deducting 𝐼. We 
assume that 𝐿𝑏 exceeds the income of 𝐵 after deducting 𝐼 (𝐿𝑏 >  𝜋𝑏 − 𝐼), and that country 𝐵 
does not offer a tax refund in case of a loss. Hence, the deductible fraction of 𝐿𝑏 is limited to 
the tax base of 𝐵.6 
𝐴 selects the form of intra-group financing that yields the lowest group tax burden, 
 
6 We additionally assume that 𝜋𝑎 ≥ 0; 𝜋𝑏 ≥ 𝐿𝑏 > (𝜋𝑏 −  𝐼); and 𝜋𝑏 > 𝐼 > 0. We abstract from agency costs, 
information asymmetries, and tax-planning costs.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727680
 
- 9 - 
thus 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝑇𝐸 , 𝑇𝐷}.
7 (3) 
As a result, 𝐴 prefers intra-group debt over equity if 




 for 𝜃 and 𝜏𝑎 + 𝑑 for 𝜏𝑏, where 𝑑 denotes the tax-rate differential 
(𝑑 = 𝜏𝑏 − 𝜏𝑎), and re-arranging Equation (4), implies a tax preference for intra-group debt if 
(𝜋𝑏 −  𝐿𝑏)(𝜏𝑎 + 𝑑) − 𝐼 𝜏𝑎 > 0. (5) 
Hence, given a positive tax-rate differential and a tax loss carry-forward that exceeds 
the income of 𝐵 after deducting 𝐼,8 Equation (5) suggests that a tax preference for either 
equity or debt depends on the size of (i) the positive tax-rate differential and (ii) the tax loss 
carry-forward.9 Holding all else constant, the tax benefit of debt increases in the positive tax-
rate differential, while equity becomes more beneficial with a larger tax loss carry-forward. 
To make an optimal tax decision (i.e., to minimize the group tax burden) decision-makers 
consider tax-rate effects and tax-base effects and balance the gain from relocating taxable 
income via interest payments with the tax effects of foregoing the tax loss carry-forward. If 
decision-makers are incentivized to make an economically optimal decision, they should 
resolve this trade-off and minimize the group tax burden.  
 
7 The choice between equity and debt financing does not alter the pre-tax cash flows or the pre-tax profits of the 
group. Moreover, any differences in total after-tax cash flows under equity or debt financing are due to differences 
in the group tax burden implied by the two financing options. Hence, by minimizing the group tax burden, parent 
company 𝐴 also maximizes the total after-tax cash flows of the group. In our model, we focus on minimizing the 
group tax burden to abstract from non-tax aspects and to give the choice between equity and debt the character of 
a tax-planning decision.  
8 The definition of 𝜃 implies that 𝐼 >  𝜋𝑏 − 𝐿𝑏  holds. 
9 Equation (5) does not hold if 𝑑 ≤ 0. In this case, intra-group equity is the tax-minimizing strategy. If 𝜃 = 1 (i.e., 
the income of 𝐵 after deducting 𝐼 exceeds its tax loss carry-forward), Equation (5) collapses to 𝐼𝑑 > 0. Thus, debt 
(equity) financing is preferable for a positive (negative) tax-rate differential while A is indifferent between both 
forms of financing if 𝑑 = 0. In our experiment, we are interested in the trade-off between the positive tax-rate 
differential and the tax loss carry-forward (Section 3) and therefore do not discuss these conditions in detail.  
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Decision Biases in Tax Decisions  
Building on Simon’s (1955) work on bounded rationality, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) identify cognitive principles that guide decision-making in complex situations. If 
decision-makers lack resources to assess the exact consequences of a complex decision, they 
seek simplifying decision strategies known as heuristics. Heuristics alleviate the complexity 
of a task, reduce its cognitive load (Kahneman 2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1974), and 
thereby diminish the information-processing costs of the decision-maker (Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier 2011). In contrast to extensive decision strategies, however, heuristics could 
imply decision biases that result in suboptimal choices (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).10 
A growing body of literature investigates decisions with tax implications. Of 
particular relevance for this study is prior work on individual decision-making, and, in 
particular, prior work on corporate tax decisions (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010). Also 
in a corporate setting, decision-makers might use heuristic decision strategies to reduce 
information-processing costs. Consistent with this argument, Powers et al. (2017) find that 
investors use the salient U.S. statutory tax rate as a heuristic in firm valuation decisions. 
Several studies, however, suggest that heuristics reduce decision quality (Low and Tan 2011; 
Braun 2000; Choo 1995; Ponemon 1992). For the corporate setting, Graham et al. (2017), for 
example, find that decision biases trigger suboptimal tax decisions, because executives 
overestimate the importance of easily accessible information (e.g., the average tax rate) 
relative to less accessible information (e.g., the marginal tax rate). These findings suggest that 
decision-makers use heuristics in corporate settings and that biased decision-making by 
individuals could contribute to suboptimal outcomes at the firm level.  
However, the question remains why and under which conditions real-world tax 
 
10 The psychological literature on the role of heuristics in decision-making can be broadly divided into two streams. 
While the classical view argues that heuristic decisions lead to poorer choices than “rational” decisions (e.g., 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974), other research suggests that using heuristics can lead to more accurate choices than 
extensive decision strategies (e.g., Gigerenzer and Gaissmair 2011). In this paper, we follow the classical view 
and investigate whether heuristics reduce the quality of tax decisions. 
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decisions might be prone to decision biases. Prior research shows that scarcity of resources, 
such as time constraints, stimulates the use of heuristics (Kocher, Pahlke, and Trautmann 
2013; Dror, Busemeyer, and Basola 1999; Hockey 1997; Payne, Bettmann, and Johnson 
1988; Rothstein 1986). To better understand the relevance and the extent of time constraints 
in real-world tax decisions, we surveyed 74 senior tax executives with, on average, more than 
20 years of professional experience.11 Using an online survey tool, we asked participants 
about time constraints in their work environment and the amount of time they would require 
to make an economically optimal tax-planning decision absent any resource constraints.12  
Our results indicate that time constraints are a critical issue in real-world tax 
decisions. On a scale from 1 (I do not agree) to 7 (I fully agree), respondents indicate that 
they are often pressed for time (Mean = 5.65, SD = 1.21), that a rapid work pace is required in 
their job (Mean = 5.95, SD = 0.95), and that they usually have too little time to prepare a tax-
planning decision (Mean = 4.86, SD = 0.90).13 Participants state that they would require much 
more time than generally available to optimally prepare a tax-planning decision (on average 
1.68 times the available time, SD = 0.46). Collectively, these results suggest that tax 
professionals face severe time constraints in their tax decisions. These constraints might 
facilitate the use of heuristics, which, in turn, could affect decision quality. 
Hypothesis Development 
Prior research suggests that decision biases are likely to arise when the resources for 
decision-making are limited and decision-makers attempt to simplify complex decisions 
(Kahneman 2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Conversely, the margin for decision biases 
 
11 We distributed the survey via email to tax professionals who are members of the International Fiscal Association 
(IFA) in Austria. 200 tax professionals received the questionnaire. 97 individuals opened the link to the survey 
and 74 completed the questionnaire. Among the respondents, 71.6 percent are male and the average age is 49.9 
years (SD = 10.26). Respondents have, on average, 22.9 years of tax-related professional experience (SD = 10.17). 
77 percent of the respondents are partners in tax-consulting firms or hold senior tax positions in the industry (i.e., 
Head of Tax/Accounting or CFO). These statistics indicate that our sample comprises tax professionals with 
substantial experience and the authority to make tax decisions. 
12 A copy of the survey is available on request. Respondents granted approval to publish anonymized results. 
13 All means are significantly larger than the midpoint (4) of the scale (untabulated, all p < 0.01, two-tailed).   
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is smaller when decision-makers have incentives to identify the optimal choice and when they 
do not face resource constraints that urge them to deviate from extensive decision strategies.  
Standard economic theory predicts, and empirical evidence confirms, that tax 
decisions in the absence of resource constraints are likely to reflect all relevant information. In 
particular, tax decisions under these circumstances should adequately reflect the tax-rate 
effects and the tax-base effects that determine the optimal choice (Huizinga et al. 2008; 
Newberry and Dhaliwal 2000; Hines and Rice 1994). Specifically, in the decision scenario 
outlined under Equation (5), standard economic theory predicts that decision-makers who are 
incentivized to make optimal choices consider tax-rate effects and tax-base effects alike and 
hence identify the tax-minimizing solution. Taken together, these arguments motivate our 
baseline hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Decision-makers consider tax-rate effects and tax-base effects in their tax 
decisions. 
Extensive decision strategies that incorporate all relevant information require time 
and cognitive effort, and often lead to optimal choices. However, financial decisions in 
practice can be complex and the resources for decision-making are often limited (Low and 
Tan 2011; Braun 2000; Choo 1995; Ponemon 1992). In particular, our survey of senior tax 
professionals reveals that resource constraints are very prevalent in real-world tax decisions. 
When the resources for decision-making are limited, decision-makers are more likely to rely 
on heuristics (Kahneman 2011, 2003) and focus on simple information that is easy to process 
(Weenig and Maarleveld 2002; Edland and Swenson 1993). By accelerating the decision-
making process, such a decision strategy reduces the information-processing costs of the 
decision-maker (Powers et al. 2017), however, it might facilitate decision biases. 
Indeed, prior research shows that tax decisions are not always optimal. Several 
studies examine differences in the visibility of tax information and find that decision-makers 
put stronger emphasis on information that is relatively visible (Graham et al. 2017). Along 
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these lines, prior research finds that increasing the visibility of relevant tax information, such 
as the marginal tax rate, has positive effects on the quality of decisions at the individual level 
(Rupert and Wright 1998) and on decisions in experimental markets (Boylan 2013). Other 
work, however, finds that overestimating the relevance of highly visible tax information can 
cause optimization errors (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009). Similarly, Rupert, Single, and 
Wright (2003) find that a lack of transparency in the tax-rate structure can lead to biased 
decision-making. Fewer studies investigate the effect of differences in the complexity of 
relevant tax information on decision-making. Abeler and Jaeger (2015), for instance, find that 
individuals tend to underestimate the relevance of relatively complex information in their tax 
decisions. Boylan and Frischmann (2006) show that the complexity of tax information could 
lead to inefficient market outcomes, but market forces effectively mitigate any decision bias.  
Tax-rate effects and tax-base effects, the two key parameters in each tax decision, 
differ in their complexity. Information on tax rates is easy to process and their economic 
consequences are easy to identify for the decision-maker. Moreover, decision-makers are well 
aware of the economic effects of changes in tax rates. Tax-base information, in contrast, is 
more complex and the economic implications of tax-base effects are less intuitive. 
Specifically, Equation (5) suggests that more operations are required to determine the 
economic consequences of a change in the tax base (i.e., the tax loss carry-forward (𝐿𝑏)) than 
to quantify the economic implications of a change in the tax rate (𝑑). Such relative differences 
in complexity might affect the extent to which decision-makers consider tax-rate effects and 
tax-base effects in their decision-making, particularly in situations where resource constraints 
hinder them from carefully analyzing all relevant information.  
Based on these arguments, we posit that when decision-makers face resource 
constraints, they might overestimate the relevance of less complex tax-rate effects relative to 
more complex tax-base effects in their tax decisions. In other words, we expect decision-
makers to reduce the cognitive load of the tax decision by using less complex tax-rate 
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information as a decision heuristic. However, such a simplified decision strategy might induce 
a decision bias if information on the tax base does not receive sufficient attention in the 
decision. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2. Resource constraints induce a tax-rate bias in tax decisions. 
Finally, we predict that increasing the magnitude of the tax-base effect mitigates the 
tax-rate bias. The theory of rational inattention assumes that decision-makers have limited 
capacity for processing all potentially relevant information (Caplin and Dean, 2015; Gabaix 
2014; Mackowiak and Wiederholt 2009; Sims 2006). Therefore, it is rational for decision-
makers to ignore information when its effect on the outcome of the decision is likely to be 
marginal (Sims 2003). Specifically, rationally inattentive decision-makers are expected to put 
less emphasis on relatively complex information when this information seems not to have a 
meaningful effect on the outcome of the decision. This argument implies that the propensity 
for biased decision-making is larger when the economic consequences of a biased decision are 
relatively small. Conversely, this theory suggests that the propensity for biased decision-
making is smaller when the consequences of a biased decision are economically meaningful.  
For the tax decision outlined under Equation (5), the theory of rational inattention 
suggests that decision-makers are more likely to underestimate the relevance of relatively 
complex tax-base information (𝐿𝑏,) if this information is expected not to have a meaningful 
effect on the group tax burden (𝑇𝐸 or 𝑇𝐷). Conversely, decision-makers should be less likely 
to exhibit a tax-rate bias and underestimate the relevance of the tax-base effect, if the tax-base 
effect (𝐿𝑏,) is expected to have a meaningful effect on the group tax burden (𝑇𝐸 or 𝑇𝐷).  
In sum, if decision-makers are rationally inattentive, we expect that the magnitude of 
the tax-base effect influences the propensity to exhibit a tax-rate bias. Specifically, we predict 
that decision-makers are less likely to underestimate the relevance of more complex tax-base 
information if the size of the tax-base effect (i.e., the tax loss carry-forward) is relatively large 
compared to the size of the tax-rate effect (i.e., the tax-rate differential). We therefore 
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hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3. An increase in the size of the tax-base effect mitigates the tax-rate bias in 
tax decisions under resource constraints. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Experimental Material 
A laboratory experiment allows us to test these hypotheses and to identify the causal 
drivers of biases in tax decisions. Our decision scenario follows the model presented in 
Section 2 and describes a firm that operates in two countries. We use this design in 
experiments with students (hereafter, student sample) and tax professionals (hereafter, 
professional sample), respectively. The task of each participant is to decide whether equity or 
debt financing provided by the parent company to the foreign subsidiary minimizes the group 
tax burden.14 To identify biases in tax decisions, we investigate the effect of systematic 
variation in tax rates and tax loss carry-forwards.  
Panel A of Table 1 depicts the experimental parameters of 16 decision tasks 
(hereafter, items). The 16 items are divided into four item groups with four items each. In the 
Baseline item group, debt financing is the tax-minimizing strategy, because the large tax-rate 
differential dominates the effect of the small tax loss carry-forward. Relative to Baseline, we 
increase the tax loss carry-forward (item group ChangeTLCF) or reduce the tax-rate 
differential (item group ChangeTD), so that equity financing becomes the tax-minimizing 
strategy for these two item groups. We simultaneously increase the tax loss carry-forward and 
the tax-rate differential so that debt financing remains the tax-minimizing strategy in the 
Symmetry item group. Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the four item groups. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
We calibrate the tax rates and the tax loss carry-forward so that the tax-burden 
 
14 Participants have a financial incentive to identify the tax-minimizing choice. We outline our compensation 
mechanism below. 
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difference between equity and debt financing varies within but not between item groups. 
Specifically, the tax-burden difference varies such that one strategy is clearly preferable for 
some items but less so for others. For example, four items (i.e., one per item group) result in a 
tax benefit of ECU 200,000 (Delta200000) for the tax-minimizing strategy, while this 
difference is only ECU 1,280 (Delta1280) for four other items (again, one per item group).15 
In addition to the within-subject variation of tax rates and the tax loss carry-forward, 
we introduce between-subject variation in the amount of time that participants have available 
to make their decisions. We randomly assign participants to a time-constraints treatment, 
where the time to make a decision is limited, or to a no-time-constraints treatment, where 
there is no time limit. To determine the time per decision in the time-constraints treatment, we 
combine information from our survey of senior tax professionals with the results of a pre-test 
with 18 faculty members. The survey reveals that tax professionals have 60 percent of the 
time necessary to optimally prepare for a tax decision, which we assume to constitute a lower 
bound of actual time constraints given the decade-long experience of our survey respondents. 
The pre-test yields an average decision time of 90 seconds. We therefore restrict the decision 
time in the time-constraints treatment to 45 seconds.16 Participants learn about the time 
limitation before the first decision and we display the remaining time for each decision on the 
screen (Low and Tan 2011). We do not force participants to make a decision within the time 
limit. Once the decision time expires, participants have no opportunity to provide an answer 
and automatically proceed to the next decision. 
To identify a tax-rate bias, i.e., unequal responses to tax-rate effects and tax-base 
 
15 Due to rounding issues, tax-burden differences between equity and debt do not match perfectly in the Delta1280 
item group. Since the divergences within Delta1280 items are small, we do not expect any effect on our results. 
16 Making a tax decision within 45 seconds might seem unusual. However, we note that real-world tax decisions 
involve significantly larger amounts of information that is also significantly more complex than the few lines of 
information we provide in our experiment. Hence, to assess whether our treatment reflects the time constraints 
faced in real-world tax decisions, it is important to put the available time and the amount of information in the 
experiment in perspective to the time and information available in real-world tax decisions. Interviews of highly 
experienced tax professionals corroborate the adequateness of our time-constraints treatment. Specifically, tax 
professionals indicate that they often face severe time constraints in real-world tax decisions, which, just like in 
our time-constraints treatment, does not allow a careful analysis of all relevant information (Section 6).  
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effects, we compare decisions from the Baseline item group with decisions from the 
ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD item groups. The tax-rate differential suggests debt financing 
for all items. However, we vary the tax loss carry-forward and the tax-rate differential so that 
equity financing is optimal for ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD items. We expect individuals to 
choose debt financing in the Baseline item group, because the large tax-rate differential 
correctly suggests so. For ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD items, however, the tax-rate 
differential incorrectly suggests debt financing while equity is the tax-minimizing strategy. If 
individuals overestimate the relevance of tax-rate effects, we expect fewer tax-minimizing 
decisions in the ChangeTLCF and the ChangeTD item group than in Baseline. While we 
predict a tax-rate bias for both item groups, the smaller tax-rate differential in the ChangeTD 
item group should induce a weaker decision bias for these items. We do not expect 
differences in decision-making when comparing Symmetry with Baseline because the tax-rate 
differential indicates debt financing, which is the tax-minimizing strategy for these items.17  
To identify rational inattention, i.e., a mitigating effect of a large tax-base effect on 
the tax-rate bias, we examine decisions within the ChangeTLCF item group. In this item 
group, the tax-rate differential is constant for all four items while the tax loss carry-forward 
increases from Delta1280 to Delta200000 items.18 If a large tax-base effect mitigates the 
decision bias, we expect more tax-minimizing decisions for ChangeTLCF items with a large 
tax loss carry-forward. Figure 1 depicts our experimental design and summarizes how our 
hypotheses relate to the four item groups and the two experimental treatments.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
17 The main reason for including Symmetry items is to obtain eight items that yield debt (Baseline and Symmetry) 
and another eight items that yield equity financing as the tax-minimizing strategy (ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD). 
18 We note that ChangeTD items do not allow the identification of rational inattention. While all parameters except 
for the tax loss-carry forward are constant within the ChangeTLCF item group, the tax rate of the parent and the 
tax rate of the subsidiary vary across ChangeTD items (the tax-rate differential, however, remains constant across 
these items). This variation is necessary to match the tax benefits of equity or debt financing across Baseline, 
ChangeTLCF, ChangeTD, and Symmetry items. It is therefore unclear whether decision patterns within the 
ChangeTD item group are driven by variation in the tax-base effect or variation in the statutory tax rates. Hence, 
ChangeTD items allow testing H1 and H2 while these items do not allow testing H3. 
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Experimental Procedure 
The experiment is programmed in Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and comprises three 
stages.19 The study starts with a questionnaire on demographics (e.g., age, professional/work 
experience, education), attitudes towards debt financing, and the ability to ignore an intuitive 
but incorrect answer in favor of a more reflective decision-making process (cognitive 
reflection test; see Frederick 2005).20 
Subsequently, participants proceed to the main part of the experiment: the tax game. 
In line with the model described in Section 2, we outline a scenario in which participants have 
to decide whether debt or equity financing minimizes the tax burden of a firm that operates in 
two countries. We explain the decision scenario in detail and apply three safeguards to ensure 
that participants fully understand their task. First, we present a table summarizing all 
information and depicting how to compute the group tax burden, conditional on the form of 
intra-group financing. On this basis, we present two model calculations, which comprise all 
relevant factors. While one model calculation yields equity as the tax-minimizing strategy, the 
other implies debt financing. Participants may access this information and the model 
calculations at any time during the experiment. Second, we explain the tax effects of both 
strategies in written form. The third and final safeguard involves three questions (check 
questions) that cover (i) the effects of the tax-rate differential, (ii) the effects of the tax loss 
carry-forward, and (iii) the taxation of dividends and interest payments. To ensure that only 
individuals who fully understand the task are included in the primary analysis, we exclude 
those who do not correctly answer the check questions from our sample.21  
The main part of the experiment consists of 16 tax decisions. In each decision, we 
present participants with statutory tax rates for the parent and the subsidiary as well as with a 
 
19 A copy of the experimental instrument is available on request. Our participants granted approval to publish 
anonymized results of our study. 
20 We include this test to control for participants’ tendency to select an intuitive but incorrect answer. As we run 
our study in German, we use the translated version of the cognitive reflection test provided by Piazolo (2007).  
21 In robustness tests, we include individuals who failed the check questions and find similar results (Table 7).  
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tax loss-carry forward (Table 1). To rule out anchoring effects or status-quo bias (Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1974), these decisions are presented in random 
order. After completing the experiment, participants answer a short questionnaire on the 
importance of the individual tax parameters (e.g., statutory tax rates, tax loss carry-forward) 
for their decisions on a scale from 1 (not important) to 9 (very important).  
Participants’ compensation depends on their performance in the tax game. We vary 
the payout between the student and the professional sample to achieve economically 
equivalent incentives. Participants in the student sample receive a show-up fee of €6 and 
€0.50 for each tax-minimizing decision. In the professional sample, participants receive a 
show-up fee of €12 and each tax-minimizing decision yields €1.22 Therefore, the maximum 
payout is €14 per person in the student sample and €28 in the professional sample. 
IV. MAIN RESULTS 
Experiment I: Student Sample 
Sample Description 
We conduct our first experiment with students attending a public business school in 
Austria.23 We invite all students to participate, including graduate students in accounting, 
taxation, and/or finance who have professional experience in these fields. We conduct the 
experiment in the computer laboratory of the university and test 185 individuals in 11 
sessions. Observations of 44 individuals are excluded from the primary analysis, because 40 
did not pass the check questions and another 4 did not provide decisions for any of the 16 
items. We do not require a full set of 16 decisions per participant.24  
The final sample consists of 141 individuals and 2,024 tax decisions, respectively.25 
 
22 We derive the payout for the professional sample from vacancies posted on online career platforms in Austria. 
The mean offer for tax consultants with several years of experience is €17 per hour (gross income). As this amount 
is based on collective bargaining agreements and actual salaries are higher, we offer a competitive compensation.  
23 The institution granted approval to conduct the experiments and to publish anonymized results of our study. 
24 In a robustness test, we limit our sample to individuals who provided decisions on all 16 items. The results of 
these tests are similar to our primary analysis (Table 7). 
25 We observe missing tax decisions in the time-constraints treatment because we do not force individuals to make 
a decision. If participants do not make a decision within 45 seconds, the item is treated as unanswered and 
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46.1 percent of the individuals in the final sample are male (Male) and the average age is 25.1 
years (Age). 27 percent of the individuals study in a graduate program in accounting, taxation, 
and/or finance (Education) and 46.8 percent have work experience in these fields (WorkExp).  
60 percent of the individuals participate in the time-constraints treatment.26 This 
treatment contains more individuals with education in accounting, taxation, and/or finance 
(z = -1.88, p = 0.06).27 Other than that, we do not observe significant differences in 
demographics between the two treatments (all p > 0.34). A session without time constraints 
lasts one hour and a session with time constraints lasts 45 minutes. Accordingly, the average 
payout in the time-constraints treatment (€10.76) is lower than the payout in the no-time-
constraints treatment (€12.82).  
Univariate Results 
We calculate the mean proportion of tax-minimizing decisions per individual (Tax-
Minimizing) for the full sample, the time-constraints treatment, and the no-time-constraints 
treatment. In the full sample, the mean of Tax-Minimizing amounts to 68.8 percent, which is 
significantly lower than the optimum of 100 percent tax-minimizing decisions (z = -9.98, 
p < 0.01).28 The mean of Tax-Minimizing equals 83.9 percent (SD = 0.20) in the no-time-
constraints treatment and 58 percent (SD = 0.19) in the time-constraints treatment. This 
difference is statistically significant (z = -6.47, p < 0.01). In both treatments, the mean is 
 
participants proceed to the next item. We do not observe a systematic pattern of missing observations across items 
(² = 0.93, df = 15, p > 0.99), which suggests that missing observations are randomly distributed. Our main results 
are unchanged when treating these missing tax decisions as suboptimal tax decisions (Table 7).  
26 We do not assign individuals to specific sessions but invite them to participate in a session that best fits their 
schedule. Thus, the number of individuals in each experimental session depends on (i) the number of registered 
individuals and (ii) the actual turnout of individuals. To ensure that the anticipated duration of the experiment is 
similar in each session, we test one treatment per session. Overall, we run five no-time-constraints sessions and 
six time-constraints sessions. We cancelled one no-time-constraints session due to a low number of registered 
individuals, which explains why the number of individuals differs between treatments. 
27 Unless indicated otherwise, all p-values reported in the manuscript are from two-tailed tests.  
28  We use non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Tests to test for differences between subsamples and 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests to test whether Tax-Minimizing differs from a specific value (e.g., the optimum of 100 
percent). Shapiro-Wilk tests support this approach as the normality assumption for Tax-Minimizing is violated in 
several subsamples and non-parametric tests are less sensitive to the underlying distribution. Inferences are similar 
when using parametric t-tests. This is plausible because t-tests that adjust for unequal variances are robust to a 
violation of the normality assumption if, as in our case, subsamples are relatively large (Scheffé 1959).  
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significantly smaller than the optimum of 100 percent (all p < 0.01) but larger than 50 percent, 
which we would expect had individuals guessed throughout (all p < 0.01). These results 
indicate that individuals do not always make tax-minimizing decisions and that resource 
constraints negatively affect decision quality. 
Figure 2 presents the mean proportion of tax-minimizing decisions per item group. 
We show this information separately for the no-time-constraints treatment and the time-
constraints treatment. In the no-time-constraints treatment, the mean of Tax-Minimizing does 
not differ between item groups (all p > 0.82). In line with H1, this result suggests that 
decision-makers consider tax-rate information and tax-base information alike. Hence, the 
inability to consistently minimize tax payments is the result of random errors. In the time-
constraints treatment, we observe the largest proportion of tax-minimizing decisions in the 
Baseline and Symmetry item groups, where the large tax-rate differential correctly suggests 
debt financing. As expected, the share of tax-minimizing decisions is significantly smaller for 
ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD items (all p < 0.01). Moreover, the share of tax-minimizing 
decisions in the ChangeTLCF item group is significantly smaller than for ChangeTD items 
(z = -1.72, p = 0.09). In line with H2, these results suggest that resource constraints induce a 
systematic tax-rate bias.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 
We test our hypotheses in a multivariate framework by estimating several variations 
of the following logistic regression model: 
 Pr (𝑇𝑎𝑥 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖,𝑗 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑇𝐿𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑇𝐷 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦 +
 𝛽 ∑ 𝑋𝑗 + 𝜀. (6) 
The dependent variable Tax-Minimizing (TM) is an indicator variable with the value 
of one if individual j makes a tax-minimizing decision in item i. ChangeTLCF, ChangeTD, 
and Symmetry are indicator variables with the value of one if item i belongs to the respective 
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item group. Since Baseline serves as a reference category, the coefficients on the indicator 
variables capture the difference in the probability of making a tax-minimizing decision in the 
respective item group relative to Baseline. For instance, negative coefficients on 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 
indicate a lower probability of making a tax-minimizing decision in ChangeTLCF and 
ChangeTD items relative to Baseline. Vector 𝑋𝑗 includes control variables for personal 
characteristics of individual j (Male, Age, Education, WorkExp, and CRT).29 In all regressions, 
we cluster standard errors at the individual level to account for serial correlation between 
observations (Petersen 2009).  
Table 2 presents the results for the full sample. In column 1, the probability of 
making a tax-minimizing decision is significantly lower for ChangeTLCF and for ChangeTD 
items than for Baseline items. Marginal effects indicate that decisions from the ChangeTLCF 
and the ChangeTD item group reduce the probability of making a tax-minimizing decision by 
14.7 and 10.9 percentage points, respectively.30 These results suggest that individuals 
overestimate tax-rate information in ChangeTD and ChangeTLCF items, providing initial 
indication for a tax-rate bias.  
To more formally test H1 and H2, we interact ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD with 
TimeConstraints, which is an indicator variable with the value of one for individuals in the 
time-constraints treatment, and zero for individuals in the no-time-constraints treatment. We 
present the results in column 2. In line with our hypotheses, we find insignificant coefficients 
on ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD, while the coefficients on ChangeTLCF#TimeConstraints 
and ChangeTD#TimeConstraints are negative and significant. Moreover, under time 
constraints, the probability of making a tax-minimizing decision is significantly lower for 
ChangeTLCF items than it is for ChangeTD items (² = 2.66, p = 0.10). These results suggest 
 
29 We provide a detailed variable definition in Appendix A.  
30 We calculate average marginal effects for each independent variable in the logistic regression while holding the 
remaining independent variables at their means.  
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that absent any resource constraints, decision-makers equally consider tax-rate information 
and tax-base information in their tax decisions. However, when facing resource constraints, 
individuals overestimate the importance of tax-rate information and exhibit a tax-rate bias.  
To further investigate the tax-rate bias, we analyze post-experimental survey 
responses and assess the relevance of the different tax parameters for individuals’ decision-
making. In both treatments, participants indicate that the tax loss carry-forward appears 
significantly less important than the tax rates (all p < 0.10). Consistent with our hypothesis, 
these differences are more pronounced in the time-constraints treatment (all p < 0.10). These 
findings suggest that decision-makers perceive tax-rate effects to be more important than tax-
base effects and hence corroborate our regression results.  
In sum, the above results support H1 and H2: Decision-makers consider tax-rate 
information and tax-base information in their tax decisions. Under resource constraints, 
however, individuals systematically overestimate tax-rate effects and exhibit a tax-rate bias. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Results for Hypothesis 3 
To test H3, we modify Equation (6) and interact ChangeTLCF with Delta25000, 
Delta60000, and Delta200000, respectively. These variables are indicator variables with the 
value of one if decision i belongs to the respective item group. We posit under H3 that, if 
decision-makers are rationally inattentive, a larger tax-base effect (i.e., a larger tax loss carry-
forward) should mitigate the tax-rate bias. We therefore predict positive coefficients on the 
interactions. 
Table 3 presents the regression results. We show the results for the full sample in 
column 1, for the time-constraints treatment in column 2, and for the no-time-constraints 
treatment in column 3. Consistent with the results in Table 2, the coefficients on 
ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD are negative and significant in columns 1 and 2 but insignificant 
in column 3. Moreover, we find that the coefficient on ChangeTLCF#Delta200000 is positive 
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and significant across all specifications. This result is consistent with our expectation and 
provides some indication that a large tax-base effect mitigates the decision bias.  
Overall, these results provide some support for H3: A large tax-base effect mitigates 
the tax-rate bias. This finding indicates a tendency for rational inattention in tax decisions. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Experiment II: Professional Sample 
Sample Description 
We repeat our experiment with tax professionals who regularly make important tax 
decisions to rule out that a lack of experience might explain our results, and to corroborate the 
external validity of our initial findings. Based on our survey results suggesting that tax 
professionals face severe time constraints in their tax decisions, we limit the second 
experiment to the time-constraints treatment. To recruit participants, we contact tax-
consulting firms in Austria and distribute an email invitation via the CFO Club Austria.31 We 
visit firms that have agreed to participate and conduct the experiment on laptop computers 
brought by the tester.  
We test 68 individuals in 15 sessions. Seven sessions include participants from tax-
consulting firms and eight sessions include participants from corporate tax departments. Five 
firms are publicly listed, two are subsidiaries of firms listed abroad, and one is a private firm. 
We exclude six individuals who did not pass the check questions. Consistent with the student 
sample, we do not require a full set of 16 decisions per individual resulting in a final sample 
of 62 individuals and 821 decisions.32 Among the participants, 58.1 percent are male (Male) 
and the average age is 38 years (Age). On average, individuals exhibit 12.8 years of tax-
 
31 CFO Club Austria (www.cfoclub.at) is a non-for-profit association that represents CFOs of the largest firms in 
Austria. Its 51 members account for 67 percent of all publicly-listed firms in Austria. The aim of the club is to 
provide a network for its members and to advance their interests. CFOs interested in our study either forwarded 
the invitation to the tax department or participated themselves in the experiment.  
32 We again do not observe a systematic pattern of missing observations across items (² = 2.48, df = 15, p > 0.99). 
In robustness tests, we (i) include individuals who did not correctly answer the check questions, (ii) limit our 
sample to individuals who provided decisions on all 16 items, and (iii) treat missing observations as suboptimal 
decisions. The results are similar to those from our main analysis (Table 7).  
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related professional experience (ProfExp). 41.9 percent hold a senior position (Senior) and 
67.7 percent work in a tax-consulting firm (TaxConsultant).33 Similar to the student sample, 
one session lasts approximately 45 minutes. The average payout is €19.8.34  
Univariate Results 
In total, we observe a maximum of 92.9 percent tax-minimizing decisions per 
individual, which suggests that no tax professional consistently makes optimal tax decisions. 
The mean proportion of tax-minimizing decisions amounts to 57.8 percent (SD = 15.8), which 
is significantly lower than the optimum of 100 percent (z = -6.85, p < 0.01) and significantly 
higher than 50 percent (z = 3.75, p < 0.01).  
Figure 2 again presents the univariate results per item group. For all item groups, the 
mean of Tax-Minimizing in the professional sample does not significantly differ from the 
time-constraints treatment of the student sample (all p > 0.35). The share of tax-minimizing 
decisions is largest in the Baseline item group and significantly smaller for ChangeTLCF and 
ChangeTD items (all p < 0.01). The difference between Baseline and Symmetry is 
insignificant (z = 1.09, p = 0.27). Consistent with the results for the student sample, the mean 
proportion of tax-minimizing decisions for ChangeTLCF items is significantly smaller than 
for ChangeTD (z = -2.82, p < 0.01). These results provide initial indication that the findings 
from the student sample also hold for tax professionals and that professional experience does 
not mitigate the tax-rate bias. 
Multivariate Results  
We next re-estimate Equation (6) on the professional sample and present the results 
in column 1 of Table 4. We include ProfExp to capture individual j’s years of professional 
experience. Compared to Baseline, we observe a significantly lower probability of making a 
 
33 Senior positions include the ranks of an (Assistant) Manager, Senior Manager, Director, and Partner in a tax-
consulting firm and the positions of the Head of Tax/Accounting and the CFO in the industry.  
34 We again introduce the payout structure while presenting the instructions for the experiment. Eleven individuals 
did not accept their payout either to support future research projects or due to compliance reasons. Since 
individuals made these decisions after the experiment, we do not expect any effects on our results.  
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tax-minimizing decision for ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD items. Marginal effects indicate 
that ChangeTLCF (ChangeTD) items reduce the probability of making a tax-minimizing 
decision by 33.0 (19.8) percentage points. The negative effect of ChangeTLCF items is again 
significantly stronger than the effect of ChangeTD items (² = 4.83, p = 0.03).  
The analysis of the post-experimental survey corroborates these results and reveals 
that decision-makers perceive the statutory tax rate of the subsidiary to be significantly more 
important than the tax loss carry-forward (p < 0.10). The mean importance of the parent’s 
statutory tax rate does not significantly differ from that of the tax loss carry-forward 
(p = 0.76). Consistent with the results for the student sample, these findings indicate that tax 
professionals overestimate tax-rate effects and exhibit a tax-rate bias in their tax decisions. 
To further explore the decision bias within the professional sample, we interact 
ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD with Senior and TaxConsultant, respectively. Senior identifies 
individuals that hold a senior position and TaxConsultant denotes professionals that work in a 
tax-consulting firm. Columns 2 and 3 present the regression results. In both columns, we 
continue to find negative and significant coefficients on ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD. The 
coefficients on all interaction terms are insignificant. These results suggest that, within the 
professional sample, the probability of making a tax-minimizing decision in the ChangeTLCF 
and the ChangeTD item group does not vary with a participant’s professional background or 
the position held by a participant.  
Next, we combine data from the professional sample with data from the time-
constraints treatment of the student sample. In column 4, we interact ChangeTLCF and 
ChangeTD with Professional, which is an indicator variable with the value of one if 
individual j belongs to the professional sample, and zero otherwise. We again find negative 
and significant coefficients on ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD while the coefficients on the 
interactions are insignificant. These results indicate that the probability of making a tax-
minimizing decision in the ChangeTLCF and the ChangeTD item group does not differ 
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between the professional and the student sample. Hence, we find no evidence that a lack of 
professional experience explains the tax-rate bias. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Finally, we investigate rational inattention in the professional sample and present the 
results in Table 5. Consistent with rational inattention, the positive and significant coefficient 
on ChangeTLCF#Delta200000 in column 1 indicates that a large tax-base effect mitigates the 
decision bias. To examine whether a decision-maker’s seniority reflects the capacity to 
allocate inattention rationally, we split the professional sample based on Senior in columns 2 
and 3.35 While we find no evidence for rational inattention among tax professionals in junior 
positions (column 2), the positive and significant coefficients on ChangeTLCF#Delta60000 
and ChangeTLCF#Delta200000 indicate that senior tax professionals allocate their inattention 
rationally (column 3).36 These results suggest that senior tax professionals are less likely to 
underestimate tax-base effects that are relatively large, i.e., tax-base effects that have a 
meaningful effect on the group tax burden. In untabulated tests, we pool the observations 
from senior tax professionals with data from the time-constraints treatment of the student 
sample. We find that the positive coefficient on ChangeTLCF#Delta200000 is significantly 
larger for senior tax professionals (p < 0.10). This result suggests that the mitigating effect of 
a large tax-base effect is stronger among senior tax professionals, consistent with senior tax 
professional being more capable of allocating their inattention rationally than students.37  
In sum, the results in this section provide evidence that professional experience does 
not mitigate the tax-rate bias per se. In fact, under time constraints, we find that tax 
professionals and students are equally prone to tax-rate bias. However, our results suggest that 
 
35 We use sample splits mainly for expositional reasons. Our results are qualitatively similar when re-estimating 
the tests in Table 5 with triple interactions (e.g., ChangeTLCF#Delta25000#Senior) instead of split samples.  
36 The coefficients on ChangeTLCF#Delta60000 and ChangeTLCF#Delta200000 significantly differ between 
columns 2 and 3 (all p < 0.10).  
37 We note that the coefficient on ChangeTLCF#Delta200000 does not differ between students and junior tax 
professionals, indicating no significant difference in rational inattention between the two groups (p = 0.85).  
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tax professionals in senior positions are more capable of allocating their inattention rationally 
than tax professionals in junior positions and students. These decision-makers are less likely 
to exhibit a tax-rate bias when exhibiting such bias is relatively costly. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
V. SUPPLEMENTARY EXPERIMENTS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
We conduct several additional analyses to rule out alternative explanations for our 
findings. Most importantly, we run two additional experiments to test whether unobserved 
debt preferences (Experiment III) or order effects (Experiment IV) explain our results. 
Experiment III: Analysis of Unobserved Debt Preferences  
In our main experiments, debt financing is the tax-minimizing strategy for Baseline 
and Symmetry items, whereas equity financing is the tax-minimizing choice in the 
ChangeTLCF and the ChangeTD item groups. This pattern raises the question whether 
unobserved preferences for debt financing, rather than a tax-rate bias, might drive our results. 
To address this concern, we design a third experiment in which we permute the tax-
minimizing strategies. Specifically, we shift the tax loss carry-forward from the subsidiary to 
the parent company and create a negative tax-rate differential (τa > τb) by altering the 
statutory tax rates.38 This design implies the identical trade-off as outlined under Equation (5). 
However, equity becomes the tax-minimizing strategy in the Baseline and the Symmetry item 
group while debt becomes preferable for ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD items. If less complex 
tax-rate information rather than unobserved debt preferences drives decision-making, we 
should observe the same pattern of results as in our main experiments, i.e., fewer tax-
minimizing decisions for ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD items than for Baseline.  
Since we assess the robustness of our main results, we disregard Symmetry items and 
 
38 We do not change the size of the tax-rate differential. Thus, the tax-rate differential is -30% (-12%) for Baseline 
and ChangeTLCF (ChangeTD) items. To ensure identical tax-burden differences between equity and debt 
financing, we reduce the tax loss carry-forward by ECU 1,000,000 for every item while leaving the pattern of the 
tax loss carry-forward across items unchanged.  
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only test the time-constraints treatment. We obtain another student sample (changed-tax-
parameter sample) and test 55 individuals in three sessions. One session lasts 40 minutes with 
an average payout of €8.6.39 Nineteen individuals did not correctly solve the check questions 
resulting in a sample of 36 individuals and 368 tax decisions.40 Among the participants, 50 
percent are male; the average age is 23.2 years. 8.3 percent of the individuals have education 
in accounting, taxation, and/or finance, and 27.8 percent have work experience in these fields.  
Table 6, column 1 presents the results from estimating Equation (6) on the changed-
tax-parameter sample. Consistent with the results from our initial experiments, we continue to 
find that the probability of making a tax-minimizing decision is significantly lower for 
ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD items than it is for Baseline items. Taken together, these results 
suggest that unobserved preferences for debt financing do not explain our findings.  
Experiment IV: Analysis of Order Effects  
We argue that the economic effects of tax rates are easier to identify than the effects 
of the tax base and that overweighing simple tax-rate information causes a decision bias. Yet, 
in Experiments I and II, we provide information on tax rates before introducing the tax loss 
carry-forward. Information on statutory tax rates might therefore appear somewhat more 
visible than information on the tax loss carry-forward (Blaufus et al. 2013). To test whether 
order effects explain our results, we conduct a fourth experiment in which we rearrange the 
tax parameters, i.e., we provide information on the tax loss carry-forward before showing the 
tax rates. Thus, if a lower complexity of tax rates, and not order effects, causes individuals to 
overestimate tax-rate information, this change should not affect our results.  
Consistent with Experiment III, we disregard Symmetry items and only run the time-
constraints treatment. We again obtain a student sample (changed-order sample) and test 63 
individuals in 3 sessions. One session lasts 40 minutes with an average payout of €8.6. We 
 
39 The average payout is lower than in the first experiment because the Symmetry item group is excluded. 
40 The results are qualitatively unchanged when including these individuals in the analysis.  
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drop 17 individuals due to incorrect check questions, yielding a sample of 46 individuals and 
502 tax decisions.41 Among the participants, 52.2 percent are male and the average age is 24.5 
years; 13 percent have education in accounting, taxation, and/or finance. 30.4 percent have 
work experience in these fields.  
We estimate Equation (6) on the changed-order sample and present the results in 
column 2 of Table 6. The coefficients on ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD remain negative and 
significant, which suggests that changing the order of the tax parameters does not affect our 
results. In untabulated tests, we combine the changed-order sample with observations from 
the time-constraints treatment of the student sample, and with observations from the 
professional sample, respectively. We interact ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD with 
ChangedOrder, which is an indicator variable with the value of one for observations from the 
changed-order sample. The coefficients on all interactions are insignificant (all p > 0.31). 
Taken together, these results suggest that order effects do not drive our findings.  
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Robustness Tests  
To conclude the analysis of our laboratory experiments, we assess whether our main 
results are robust to changes in the sample selection criteria. We re-estimate Equation (6) on 
modified samples and report the results in Table 7. Columns 1 to 3 include modified student 
samples and columns 4 to 6 modified professional samples.42 First, we exclude individuals 
who do not provide decisions for all 16 items. This step reduces the student (professional) 
sample to 23 (12) individuals. Even after this substantial reduction in sample size, the 
coefficients on ChangeTLCF remain negative and significant in columns 1 and 4. Second, we 
drop the requirement of correct check questions, which extends both samples to any 
observation, irrespective of whether individuals passed this safeguard. This step yields 104 
 
41 The results are qualitatively unchanged when including these individuals in the analysis. 
42 Consistent with the previous analysis, we limit the student sample to observations from the time-constraints 
treatment. Inferences remain qualitatively unchanged when using the full sample.  
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(68) individuals for the student (professional) sample. In columns 2 and 5, we continue to find 
negative and significant coefficients on ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD. Third, we treat items 
where individuals do not make a decision within the time limit as suboptimal decisions, 
resulting in a full set of 16 decisions per individual. Consistent with our main analysis, the 
coefficients on ChangeTLCF and ChangeTD remain negative and significant in columns 3 
and 6. In sum, these tests underline the robustness of our main results. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
VI. EXTERNAL VALIDITY  
To investigate whether our experimental design reflects the decision environment of 
real-world tax decisions, we conduct in-depth interviews with eight senior tax professionals. 
The interviews focus on the prevalence of resource constraints in practice, and particularly on 
the effect of time constraints on real-world tax decisions. In contrast to the survey of tax 
professionals presented above, the interviews provide detailed insight into the decision-
making of senior tax professionals, and therefore speak to the validity of our experimental 
design and, more broadly, to the external validity our findings.  
In total, we interview five senior corporate tax executives (all vice presidents of 
global taxes) and three experienced tax consultants (all partners in Big-4 or second-tier 
consulting firms). On average, interviewees have 28 years of tax-related professional 
experience.43 The firms represented by the tax executives are publicly listed multinationals 
that altogether held more than $ 350 billion in assets in 2019. The interviewees regularly 
prepare and/or make important tax decisions, such as global mergers and acquisitions, the 
design of global tax structures, or the pricing of intra-firm transactions. These tax decisions 
are similar to the ones modeled in our experiment.  
 
43 We provide additional descriptive information in Table B1.  
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We use a semi-structured interview approach with pre-defined questions (see Table 
B2 in Appendix B) and allow interviewees to fully express themselves, for instance to provide 
examples or to add more context to their responses (Alsaawi 2014). We do not share specific 
information or questions prior to the interview. All interviews are conducted by the same 
author via video calls and audio recorded with interviewees’ permission.44 One interview lasts 
approximately 30 minutes. We analyze the interviews in a three-step process. First, all audio 
recordings are transcribed. Second, we sort the interview responses by the pre-defined 
questions. Third, we extract interview sections that reflect the core argument of an 
interviewee for a particular question. This selection was made independently by two authors. 
Quotes that were deemed to be relevant by both authors are presented in Table B2. Full 
transcripts of the interviews are available on request. 
In the following, we summarize the main findings from the interviews. Consistent 
with our survey, the interviews confirm that tax executives and tax consultants often work 
under substantial time constraints. Time constraints are common in routine situations, such as 
the preparation of financial statements or tax returns. Importantly, the interviews reveal that 
time constraints also play a crucial role in important, non-routine decisions, such as mergers 
and acquisitions, changes to the supply chain, and financing decisions. The interviews also 
suggest that time constraints prevent decision-makers from considering all relevant 
information in their decisions (“There was a project, for instance, where we acquired 120 
affiliates, so one could not go into detail with respect to every affiliate. It was not possible 
[due to] the amount of work and the time pressure to get the closing done.”, Executive C). 
When asked for the origins of time constraints in tax decisions, interviewees state 
that internal tax departments as well as external tax consultants are frequently involved only 
at the end of corporate decision processes. Moreover, time constraints are induced by the 
 
44 We make sure that the interviewees were not associated with the study prior to the interviews, i.e., they did not 
participate in the initial survey nor did they participate in the experiment. Interviewees granted approval to publish 
anonymized results. 
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leadership style of top management or by budget constraints. These statements indicate that 
time constraints in real-world tax decisions arise from limited resources for decision-making 
and from the design of internal decision processes (“There are frequently situations where the 
firm had time for weeks, and then all of a sudden you, as a consultant, get 48 hours to assess 
a case that is maybe not even entirely laid out to you.”, Consultant A).  
Moreover, the interviews provide insight into the strategies tax professionals apply 
when facing time constraints in real-world tax decisions. Specifically, the interviews reveal 
that under time constraints, tax professionals rely on their intuition or apply “rules of thumb” 
(i.e., decision heuristics). Applying heuristics, however, can impair decision quality (“We 
effectively operate a kind of rule of thumb in terms of how we are making a divestiture (…). 
That rule of thumb may make sense in 80% of the cases, you know, but there’s 20% of the 
cases where if you apply that rule you get a completely ridiculous outcome.”, Executive E). 
As a result, real-world tax decisions are often “good enough” rather than “perfect” (“Solutions 
today under the time constraints that we all face are good enough. This is the aspiration level. 
(…) It is about good enough and fast enough.”, Executive B). These results suggest that tax 
decisions under time constraints are not always the result of an extensive decision-making 
process that carefully reflects all relevant information. Rather, decision-makers rely on 
simplifying decision strategies that can result in suboptimal outcomes.  
The interviews also indicate that rational inattention is common in real-world tax 
decisions. Interviewees state that fewer resources are invested in decisions with relatively 
small financial consequences. Specifically, when time constraints urge rapid decisions, 
decision-makers are more likely to ignore complex information, in particular if the financial 
stakes are low (“And then we said at some point, ok, 10, 15 million, it does not really matter, 
because it does not make a big difference in this deal.”, Executive D).  
Finally, the interviewees discuss strategies to alleviate time constraints and to 
increase the quality of their decisions, such as time management or peer feedback. Moreover, 
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several tax executives point out that increasing the tax department’s influence within the firm, 
for example by involving the tax function in the early stages of a business decision, does not 
only reduce time constraints but also increases the quality of tax decisions. However, one 
interviewee doubts that time constraints can be eliminated in tax decisions altogether.  
The interviews corroborate that resource constraints are an important factor in real-
world tax decisions, and that such constraints may lead to suboptimal decisions. In particular, 
time constraints are prevalent in important, non-routine tax decisions that resemble the 
decision context of our experiment, such as mergers and acquisitions, changes to the supply 
chain, and financing decisions. Since resource constraints prevent decision-makers from 
carefully analyzing all relevant information, real-world tax decisions are not always the result 
of an extensive decision process (“That’s nice in theory, but I have to admit, in practice, this 
works very rarely.”, Executive A), and tax-rate information might receive greater attention 
than tax-base information (“I believe tax rates sometimes play a bigger role [than the tax 
base].”, Consultant A). In sum, the interviews support the external validity of our findings and 
suggest that our experiments capture a fundamental mechanism of real-world tax decisions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This study investigates biases in tax decisions. In a series of four laboratory 
experiments, we show that under time constraints, decision-makers systematically 
overestimate tax-rate information while underestimating the economic consequences of the 
tax base. This behavior leads to suboptimal decision-making. The tax-rate bias is unaffected 
by professional experience as students and tax professionals are similarly prone to biased 
decision-making. However, we find that tax professionals in senior positions are more capable 
of allocating their inattention rationally than their junior colleagues and students. These 
decision-makers are less likely to exhibit a tax-rate bias when exhibiting such bias is 
relatively costly. In-depth interviews with eight senior tax professionals support these results 
and corroborate the external validity of our experimental findings.  
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Our results have several implications for tax policy, corporate tax decisions, and 
future research. First, our findings contribute to the understanding of behavioral responses to 
tax-rate cutting and tax-base broadening reforms (Alm 2018; Carone, Schmidt, and Nicodeme 
2007). Since public debates on tax reforms focus primarily on tax-rate changes, taxpayers 
might underestimate the economic consequences of simultaneous base-broadening efforts 
(e.g., limitations on the use of tax loss carry-forwards, limitations on the deductibility of 
business expenses, extensions of the tax depreciation schedule, etc.) and insufficiently adapt 
their tax strategies. Such a behavioral response could explain why corporate tax revenues in 
the OECD remain largely constant despite falling statutory corporate tax rates (OECD 2020). 
Moreover, policy makers might acknowledge decision biases in designing tax policy.  
Second, our findings indicate that overestimating the importance of relatively simple 
(tax-rate) information has the potential to cause economically suboptimal tax decisions. This 
finding provides a new, behavioral perspective for the observation that many firms appear not 
to minimize their tax burden (Dyreng et al. 2008). Our findings are also relevant for a firm’s 
tax strategies because several real-world tax systems offer optional tax-rate reductions for 
particular types of income at the cost of limited deduction opportunities. For example, firms 
may opt to be taxed on sales at a lower rate rather than on profits at a higher rate. Due to the 
lower complexity of tax-rate information, decision-makers could underestimate foregone 
deduction opportunities and choose a suboptimal tax treatment.  
Third, our findings indicate that resource constraints increase the likelihood that 
decision-makers overestimate the importance of relatively simple tax-rate information. This 
result suggests that even highly experienced tax professionals might use heuristics if the 
resources for decision-making are limited. Conversely, the lack of evidence for a decision 
bias in situations without resource constraints indicates that the availability of sufficient 
resources for decision-making could reduce the likelihood of a tax-rate bias. In this regard, 
several interviewees point out that including the tax function in the early stages of corporate 
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decision processes can reduce time constraints and ensure that all tax effects receive adequate 
attention in corporate tax decisions. 
Fourth, our results indicate that a decision-maker’s capacity to allocate inattention 
rationally can mitigate the tax-rate bias. This finding suggests that the prevalence of biases in 
tax decisions depends not only on the decision context, but also on decision-makers’ ability to 
allocate their attention toward the most important decision parameters, in particular when the 
financial stakes are high. This finding provides a new perspective on the effect of individuals 
and their decision-making on corporate tax behavior (Dyreng et al. 2010).  
Fifth, our results have several implications for future experimental research. For 
example, our results suggest that experienced students could be valid surrogates for laboratory 
experiments that explore real-world tax decisions. This finding might stimulate future 
experimental research in tax and accounting because access to professional samples is costly 
and archival data on individual decisions is often unavailable. Moreover, since our results 
suggest that rational inattention mitigates the effect of resource constraints, future research 
could examine in greater detail the factors that affect rational inattention. Future experiments 
could also study the potential of other factors, such as feedback mechanisms (e.g., through 
external consultants or peers) or strict time management in reducing biases in tax decisions. 
Finally, our findings are informative for empirical tax research. Specifically, our 
results suggest that even highly experienced decision-makers might overemphasize strategies 
that exploit differences in tax rates between countries (e.g., cross-jurisdictional income 
shifting) while neglecting base-reducing strategies. Future research could, for instance, 
examine to what extent tax-base effects are reflected in firms’ income-shifting strategies and 
explore whether tax-rate biases could result in too much income being shifted from seemingly 
high-tax subsidiaries to seemingly low-tax subsidiaries. Along these lines, our results also 
inform research on (cross-border) investment by indicating that investment decisions could 
respond more strongly to changes in tax rates than to changes in the tax base. Empirically, this 
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result suggests that investment decisions might be more sensitive to statutory tax rates than to 
effective tax rates, which incorporate tax-base effects. Moreover, our findings speak to 
research that studies variation in tax-loss utilization across firms (Cooper and Knittel 2006). 
While prior research suggests that signaling to lenders could explain the underutilization of 
tax losses (Saavedra and Hughes 2019), our study provides a behavioral explanation for this 
widespread phenomenon. Hence, future research could examine whether the tendency to 
underestimate tax-base information contributes to low utilization of tax losses. 
Although laboratory experiments offer insights into the behavioral dimension of tax 
decisions, we are unable to model all aspects of real-world decision-making. In reality, 
several additional factors influence tax decisions, including the availability of tax consultants, 
collective decision-making, liquidity aspects, risk considerations, managerial incentives, and 
financial-accounting consequences. Given our interest in isolating the role of tax-rate 
information and tax-base information in tax decisions, we do not address these dimensions.  
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Appendix A – Variable Definitions 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
Tax-Minimizing 
TM 
Indicator variable with the value of one if individual j 
makes a tax-minimizing decision in item i, and zero 
otherwise (i.e., the decision is not tax minimizing).  
  
ITEM-GROUP VARIABLES  
Baseline Indicator variable with the value of one if item i belongs 
to the Baseline item group (items 1-4), and zero 
otherwise.   
ChangeTLCF Indicator variable with the value of one if item i belongs 
to the ChangeTLCF item group (items 5-8), and zero 
otherwise. 
  
ChangeTD Indicator variable with the value of one if item i belongs 
to the ChangeTD item group (items 13-16), and zero 
otherwise.   
Symmetry Indicator variable with the value of one if item i belongs 
to the Symmetry item group (items 9-12), and zero 
otherwise.   
Delta1280 Indicator variable with the value of one if item i belongs 
to the Delta1280 item group (items 4, 5, 12, and 13), and 
zero otherwise.   
Delta25000 Indicator variable with the value of one if item i belongs 
to the Delta25000 item group (items 3, 6, 11, and 14), 
and zero otherwise.   
Delta60000 Indicator variable with the value of one if item i belongs 
to the Delta60000 item group (items 2, 7, 10, and 15), 
and zero otherwise.   
Delta200000 Indicator variable with the value of one if item i belongs 
to the Delta200000 item group (items 1, 8, 9, and 16), 
and zero otherwise. 
  
PARTITIONING VARIABLES  
TimeConstraints Indicator variable with the value of one if individual j is 
allocated to the time-constraints treatment, and zero 
otherwise (i.e., to the no-time-constraints treatment).  
  
Senior Indicator variable with the value of one if individual j 
belongs to the professional sample and holds a senior 
position, and zero otherwise. Senior positions include the 
ranks of an (Assistant) Manager, Senior Manager, 
Director, and Partner in a tax-consulting firm, and of a 
Head of Tax/Accounting and a CFO in industry.    
TaxConsultant Indicator variable with the value of one if individual j 
works in a tax-consulting firm, and zero otherwise (i.e., 
in a corporate tax department).   
Professional Indicator variable with the value of one if individual j 
belongs to the professional sample, and zero otherwise 
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(i.e., to the time-constraints treatment of the student 
sample).   
ChangedOrder Indicator variable with the value of one if individual j 
belongs to the changed-order sample, and zero otherwise 
(i.e., to the time-constraints treatment of the student 
sample or to the professional sample).   
  
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Male Indicator variable with the value of one if individual j is 
male, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
Age Discrete variable for the age of individual j.   
Education Indicator variable with the value of one if individual j is 
studying in a graduate program with a focus on 
accounting, taxation, and/or finance, and zero otherwise.   
WorkExp Indicator variable with the value of one if individual j 
has at least one month of work experience in the area of 
accounting, taxation, and/or finance, and zero otherwise.   
CRT Discrete variable for the number of correctly solved 
questions of the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 
2005; on a scale from 0 to3).   
ProfExp Discrete variable for the years of professional experience 
of individual j.  
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Appendix B – Interviews with Senior Tax Professionals 
We have conducted in-depth interviews with eight highly experienced tax 
professionals to investigate whether our experimental design reflects the decision 
environment of real-world tax decisions and to better understand the effect of resource 
constraints on these decisions. We interviewed five senior corporate tax executives 
(Executives A to E) and three experienced tax consultants (Consultants A to C). Table B1 
presents descriptive information for the interviewees. All interviewees are male with an 
average age of 54.6 years (SD = 12.39). On average, interviewees exhibit 27.6 years of tax-
related professional experience (SD = 9.95) and have worked in their current position for 13.6 
years (SD = 9.84).  
Table B1 
Descriptive Information for Interviewees 
  






Years in current position? 
Mean 13.63 
SD 9.84 
Years of tax-related professional experience? 
Mean 27.56 
SD 9.95 
Note: This table summarizes descriptive information for the eight interviewees. 
In total, we interviewed five senior corporate tax executives and three 
experienced tax consultants.  
Table B2 displays quotes from the interviews. The table is organized along the main 
questions asked during the interviews (column 1) and presents quotes that reflect the core 
argument of an interviewee (column 2). As outlined in Section 6, the pre-defined questions in 
column 1 provided the basis for the in-depth interviews. Consistent with a semi-structured 
approach, we allowed interviewees to deviate from these questions, for instance to provide 
additional examples or to add more context to their responses (Alsaawi 2014). The interviews 
were conducted in German or English. For interviews in German, the quotes in Table B2 are 
translations. Full transcripts of the interviews are available on request. All interviewees 
granted approval to publish anonymized results of the interviews.  
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Table B2 




Quotes from Interviews 
Prevalence and magnitude of resource constraints and time constraints 
What is the magnitude of time constraints 
in real-world tax decisions? 
• “We have five days for our annual financial 
statements and three days for our quarterly 
financial statements.” (Executive A).  
• “Usually, there are a few clients who think that if 
the annual financial statement is due on September 
30, it is sufficient to hand over the paperwork to the 
consultant 5 days earlier.” (Consultant A). 
• “There are frequently situations where the firm had 
time for weeks, and then all of a sudden you, as a 
consultant, get 48 hours to assess a case that is 
maybe not even entirely laid out to you.” 
(Consultant A). 
• “We are often contacted by the lawyers shortly 
before the contracts are supposed to be signed, to 
figure out the tax details. (…). Often it’s two days 
before the contract should be signed.” (Consultant 
C). 
Which specific decision scenarios are 
characterized by severe resource 
constraints and, in particular, by severe 
time constraints? 
• “In year XX we had this merger. We had one month 
for this merger. This is unimaginable today. In one 
month we had to set up the, at that time, largest 
global merger.” (Executive B). 
• “There was a project, for instance, where we 
acquired 120 affiliates, so one could not go into 
detail with respect to every affiliate. It was not 
possible [due to] the amount of work and the time 
pressure to get the closing done.” (Executive C). 
• “COVID is constantly disrupting our supply 
chains, so that something that used to come from 
China now comes from Vietnam, for instance. (…). 
I do not think that you wait for an APA [Advanced 
Pricing Agreement] in such a situation. You do not 
wait until you have the final documentation. De 
facto, the risk is with the tax department. And, of 
course, that is not so easy for the employees.” 
(Executive B). 
Sources of time constraints 
Which factors induce time constraints in 
real-world tax decisions? 
• “In practice, tax planning and tax decisions happen 
often at the end of the decision process. And this 
creates time pressure.” (Consultant B). 
• “Unjustified time pressure is frequently created by 
top management, that is the board, because there is 
always a sense of urgency, even when the issues 
are relatively unimportant.” (Executive D). 
• “From the corporate point of view, when it comes 
to external consultants, cost pressure is often an 
issue. (…) So, it is: ‘only look into this! We have 
already thought about all the other issues’ – or 
not.” (Consultant A). 
Decision strategies under time constraints 
How do you make real-world tax • “Does this have anything to do with a legal or any 
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decisions when experiencing time 
constraints? 
other sort of analysis? No. But it has always been 
like this in the past. (…) So it is a best guess. Or, 
not best guess but guess.“ (Executive D).  
• “Our young colleagues, who have perhaps three or 
four years of professional experience, then always 
wonder and ask how this is possible. Well, you 
develop a feeling. I have made about 10 
acquisitions in the U.S. and at some point you have 
just figured it out.” (Executive C)  
• “I have a partner who is incredibly successful with 
clients (…). I am definitely a better tax lawyer (…), 
but he has an incredible gut feeling. So, when I am 
in doubt, whether I should go with option A or 
option B (…) he is mostly right.” (Consultant A). 
• “It is professional ability and gut feeling.” 
(Executive B).  
• “You do not have the information you need. And 
then closing day is approaching and the opening 
balance sheet is due. And then one has to say, ok, 
there’s the big fat [rule of] thumb to decide how to 
make it.” (Executive C). 
• “We effectively operate a kind of rule of thumb in 
terms of how we are making a divestiture (…). That 
rule of thumb may make sense in 80% of the cases, 
you know, but there’s 20% of the cases where if 
you apply that rule you get a completely ridiculous 
outcome.” (Executive E). 
• So, you need people who are sort of intelligent 
decision-makers in applying rules of thumb. (…) 
It’s dangerous if you’ve got people who are not. 
That’s when you get in trouble, if people just apply 
things blindly.” (Executive E). 
•  “I believe tax rates sometimes play a bigger role 
[than the tax base].”, Consultant A. 
Do the decision strategies under time 
constraints vary with what is at stake in a 
tax decision? (Rational inattention) 
• “Well, obviously, you’ve got notable different 
factors there. So, there is (…) what is the size of the 
prize, right?” (Executive E).  
• “And then we said at some point, ok, 10, 15 million, 
it does not really matter, because it does not make 
a big difference in this deal. (…)” (Executive D). 
• “We [the tax department] are always on board. 
Except when it is a minor deal. We have around 
300 deals per year. So, when it is about 20-30 
million, it is simply done. But these are not 
dramatic decisions.“ (Executive D). 
Consequences of time constraints 
How do time constraints affect the quality 
of real-world tax decisions?  
• “If time pressure is not too severe (…) then time 
pressure can be constructive in my opinion.” 
(Consultant C).  
• “When there is really, really little time, for instance 
when I have to evaluate a business model in two 
hours and give a go or a no-go, then it’s safety 
before finances.” (Executive A). 
• “In M&A transactions (…) extreme time 
constraints can lead to decisions being less 
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precise.” (Executive C).  
• “Solutions today under the time constraints that we 
all face are good enough. This is the aspiration 
level. (…) It is about good enough and fast 
enough.” (Executive B). 
• “It gets tougher and tougher, people are pushing 
more and more that decisions are made much 
faster under very much, enormous pressure (…). 
You have to figure out all the details of a case, and 
only once you have made a detailed analysis you 
can give a recommendation. That’s nice in theory, 
but I have to admit, in practice, this works very 
rarely.” (Executive A).  
Strategies to alleviate time constraints and to increase decision quality 
Which strategies do you use to alleviate 
time constraints in real-world tax 
decisions and to increase decision quality? 
• “The most important thing for me is to plan 
ahead.” (Executive A).  
• “When I am relatively sure, but not entirely, I get in 
touch with my peers.” (Consultant C).  
• “I also have informal meetings with my peers.” 
(Executive A). 
• “We are very closely involved in these processes 
(…) if you want the tax department to be creative 
(…) then it needs to have equal rights and it needs 
to be involved in all events. This is the only way to 
do it in my opinion.” (Executive C).  
• “One has to bring these issues up and say if you 
make a decision, then you have to rely on the tax 
department. (…) So, if you sell it internally (…) you 
have made a huge step.” (Executive B). 
• “The most important thing is to discuss very early 
in the process which paperwork is necessary, 
which topics could come up and which external 
information you need.” (Consultant C). 
• “The theoretical concepts are clear. Strict time 
management, account for time buffers. Who really 
does that?” (Consultant A).  
Note: This table presents direct quotes from the interviews with eight senior tax professionals. Column 1 shows 
the main questions asked during the interviews. Column 2 presents direct quotes from the interviews that reflect 
the core argument of each interviewee. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1  




Notes: This figure depicts our conceptual framework and the experimental design. The experimental design is 
based on four item groups with four tax decisions (items) each. In the Baseline item group, the large tax-rate 
differential (TD) and the small tax loss carry-forward (TLCF) imply debt financing as the optimal choice. In the 
ChangeTLCF (ChangeTD) item group, we increase (reduce) the tax loss carry-forward (the tax-rate differential) 
so that equity becomes the optimal choice. In the Symmetry item group, we jointly increase the tax-rate differential 
and the tax loss carry-forward so that debt remains the optimal choice. H1 predicts that individuals consider tax-
rate effects and tax-base effects in their tax decisions. H2 predicts that, under resource constraints, individuals 
overestimate the importance of tax-rate information, leading to suboptimal decisions (i.e., debt choices) in the 
ChangeTLCF and the ChangeTD item group (tax-rate bias). H3 predicts that an increase in the size of the tax-
base effect (i.e., the tax loss carry-forward) mitigates the decision bias. Since the tax loss carry-forward increases 
within ChangeTLCF items, we expect the mitigating effect to occur in this item group. Table 1 depicts our items 
(Panel A) and item groups (Panel B). 
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Figure 2  
Tax-Minimizing Decisions per Item Group (Student and Professional Sample) 
 
Note: This figure presents the distribution of tax-minimizing decisions (Tax-Minimizing) per item group (i.e., 
Baseline, ChangeTLCF, ChangeTD, and Symmetry) and treatment (i.e., time-constraints and no-time-constraints 
treatment). We present information separately for the student sample and the professional sample. Tax-Minimizing 
captures the number of tax-minimizing decisions relative to the total number of decisions per item group. Error 
bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. The definition of item groups follows Panel B of Table 1. 
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Table 1  
Overview of 16 Items and 4 Item Groups  
Panel A: Tax Parameters for the 16 Items 
Item 1  Item 9 
Item Group Baseline  Item Group  Symmetry 
Delta Delta200000  Delta Delta200000 
Tax-rate differential 30.00%  Tax-rate differential  35.12% 
Tax loss carry-forward 2,400,000  Tax loss carry-forward 3,200,000 
Tax benefit debt 200,000  Tax benefit debt 200,000 
     
Item 2  Item 10 
Item Group Baseline  Item Group  Symmetry 
Delta Delta60000  Delta Delta60000 
Tax-rate differential 30.00%  Tax-rate differential  35.12% 
Tax loss carry-forward 2,680,000  Tax loss carry-forward 2,920,000 
Tax benefit debt 60,000  Tax benefit debt 60,000 
     
Item 3  Item 11 
Item Group Baseline  Item Group Symmetry 
Delta Delta25000  Delta Delta200000 
Tax-rate differential 30.00%  Tax-rate differential  35.12% 
Tax loss carry-forward 2,750,000  Tax loss carry-forward 2,850,000 
Tax benefit debt 25,000  Tax benefit debt 25,000 
     
Item 4  Item 12 
Item Group Baseline  Item Group  Symmetry 
Delta Delta1280  Delta Delta1280 
Tax-rate differential 30.00%  Tax-rate differential  35.12% 
Tax loss carry-forward 2,797,430  Tax loss carry-forward 2,802,570 
Tax benefit debt 1,285  Tax benefit debt 1,260 
     
Item 5  Item 13 
Item Group ChangeTLCF  Item Group  ChangeTD 
Delta Delta1280  Delta Delta1280 
Tax-rate differential 30.00%  Tax-rate differential  12.00% 
Tax loss carry-forward 2,802,570  Tax loss carry-forward 2,797,430 
Tax benefit equity  1,285  Tax benefit equity 1,283 
     
Item 6  Item 14 
Item Group ChangeTLCF  Item Group ChangeTD 
Delta Delta25000  Delta Delta25000 
Tax-rate differential 30.00%  Tax-rate differential  12.00% 
Tax loss carry-forward 2,850,000  Tax loss carry-forward 2,750,000 
Tax benefit equity 25,000  Tax benefit equity 25,000 
     
Item 7  Item 15 
Item Group ChangeTLCF  Item Group ChangeTD 
Delta Delta60000  Delta Delta60000 
Tax-rate differential 30.00%  Tax-rate differential  12.00% 
Tax loss carry-forward 2,920,000  Tax loss carry-forward 2,680,000 
Tax benefit equity 60,000  Tax benefit equity 60,000 
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Item 8  Item 16 
Item Group ChangeTLCF  Item Group ChangeTD 
Delta Delta200000  Delta Delta200000 
Tax-rate differential 30.00%  Tax-rate differential  12.00% 
Tax loss carry-forward 3,200,000  Tax loss carry-forward 2,400,000 
Tax benefit equity 200,000  Tax benefit equity 200,000 
 
Panel B: Tax Parameters for the 4 Item Groups  
Item Group Baseline ChangeTLCF ChangeTD Symmetry 
Items 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6, 7, 8 13, 14, 15, 16 9, 10, 11, 12 
Tax-rate differential 30.00% 30.00% 12.00% 35.12% 
Tax loss carry-forward Small Large Small Large 
Optimal strategy Debt Equity Equity Debt 
     
Delta Delta1280 Delta25000 Delta60000 Delta200000 
Items 4, 5, 12, 13 3, 6, 11, 14 2, 7, 10, 15 1, 8, 9, 16 
Tax-burden difference 1,280 25,000 60,000 200,000 
Note: This table summarizes the tax parameters for the 16 items used in the experiment (Panel A) and the 4 item 
groups that comprise these 16 items (Panel B). Items 1-4 belong to Baseline, items 5-8 to ChangeTLCF, items 9-
12 to Symmetry, and items 13-16 to ChangeTD. Simultaneously, items 1, 8, 9, and 16 belong to Delta200000, 
items 2, 7, 10, and 15 to Delta60000, items 3, 6, 11, and 14 to Delta25000, and items 4, 5, 12, and 13 to Delta1280. 
Delta values indicate the tax benefit (in ECU) from choosing the tax-minimizing form of financing. 
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Table 2 
Regressions Results for Tests of H1 and H2 (Student Sample) 
 (1) (2) 




Variables TM TM 
ChangeTLCF -0.726*** 0.404 
 (0.198) (0.295) 
ChangeTLCF#TimeConstraints  -1.888*** 
  (0.314) 
ChangeTD -0.540*** 0.460 
 (0.177) (0.287) 
ChangeTD#TimeConstraints  -1.648*** 
  (0.297) 
Symmetry -0.111 -0.112 
 (0.123) (0.123) 
Male 0.246 0.235 
 (0.184) (0.165) 
Age -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Education 0.038 0.235 
 (0.243) (0.205) 
WorkExp 0.124 0.050 
 (0.215) (0.188) 
CRT 0.115 0.134* 
 (0.081) (0.074) 
Constant 1.068*** 0.880*** 
  (0.347) (0.318) 
Observations 2,024 2,024 
Pseudo R² 0.024 0.086 
Note: This table presents the regression results for tests of H1 and H2 based on the 
student sample. We estimate the logistic regression specified under Equation (6) 
and report regression coefficients. The regressions in all columns include the full 
sample. Tax-Minimizing (TM) is the dependent variable and takes the value of one 
if individual j makes a tax-minimizing decision in item i. We estimate robust 
standard errors clustered on the individual-level (provided in parentheses). *, **, 
and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-
tailed).   
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Table 3 
Regression Results for Tests of H3 (Student Sample) 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 
Treatment  
Full  Time No Time 
Sample Constraints Constraints 
Variables TM TM TM 
ChangeTLCF -0.965*** -1.406*** -0.433 
 (0.223) (0.331) (0.384) 
ChangeTLCF#Delta25000 0.136 0.179 0.108 
 (0.205) (0.334) (0.326) 
ChangeTLCF#Delta60000 0.180 0.224 0.222 
 (0.174) (0.300) (0.222) 
ChangeTLCF#Delta200000 0.669*** 0.564* 1.725*** 
 (0.210) (0.305) (0.554) 
ChangeTD -0.540*** -0.862*** -0.001 
 (0.177) (0.222) (0.354) 
Symmetry -0.111 -0.172 -0.033 
 (0.123) (0.171) (0.188) 
Male 0.247 0.211 0.274 
 (0.185) (0.146) (0.418) 
Age -0.007 0.006 -0.007 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) 
Education 0.036 0.149 1.163* 
 (0.244) (0.199) (0.657) 
WorkExp 0.124 -0.023 -0.049 
 (0.215) (0.190) (0.390) 
CRT 0.115 0.030 0.377* 
 (0.082) (0.071) (0.195) 
Constant 1.071*** 0.604* 1.117* 
  (0.348) (0.312) (0.586) 
Observations 2,024 1,083 941 
Pseudo R² 0.026 0.044 0.066 
Note: This table presents the regression results for tests of H3 based on the student sample. 
The regression in column 1 includes the full sample, in column 2 the time-constraints 
treatment, and in column 3 the no-time-constraints treatment. We estimate a modified 
version of the logistic regression specified under Equation (6) and report regression 
coefficients. Tax-Minimizing (TM) is the dependent variable and takes the value of one if 
individual j makes a tax-minimizing decision in item i. We estimate robust standard errors 
clustered on the individual-level (provided in parentheses). *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 4 
Regression Results for the Effect of Professional Experience (Student/Professional Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 












Variables TM TM TM TM 
ChangeTLCF -1.363*** -1.555*** -1.436*** -1.172*** 
 (0.296) (0.362) (0.382) (0.262) 
ChangeTLCF#Senior  0.455   
  (0.348)   
ChangeTLCF#TaxConsultant   0.110  
   (0.356)  
ChangeTLCF#Professional    -0.168 
    (0.391) 
ChangeTD -0.817*** -0.663** -0.745** -0.875*** 
 (0.253) (0.295) (0.379) (0.214) 
ChangeTD#Senior  -0.389   
  (0.337)   
ChangeTD#TaxConsultant   -0.106  
   (0.390)  
ChangeTD#Professional    0.084 
    (0.312) 
Symmetry -0.237 -0.237 -0.237 -0.199 
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.126) 
Male 0.085 0.084 0.086 0.159 
 (0.159) (0.159) (0.158) (0.110) 
Age -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.006) 
ProfExp -0.004 -0.005 -0.005  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
CRT 0.079 0.080 0.079 0.033 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.051) 
Constant 1.293*** 1.289*** 1.290*** 1.063*** 
  (0.469) (0.494) (0.480) (0.210) 
Observations 821 821 821 1,904 
Pseudo R² 0.054 0.058 0.055 0.046 
Note: This table presents the regression results for the effect of professional experience. We estimate a 
modified version of the logistic regressions specified under Equation (6) and report regression 
coefficients. The regressions in columns 1-3 include the professional sample. The regression in column 
4 includes the professional sample and the time-constraints treatment of the student sample. Tax-
Minimizing (TM) is the dependent variable and takes the value of one if individual j makes a tax-
minimizing decision in item i. We estimate robust standard errors clustered on the individual-level 
(provided in parentheses). *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively 
(two-tailed).   
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Table 5  
Additional Regression Results for the Effect of Professional Experience 
(Professional Sample) 
  
(1) (2) (3) 













Variables TM TM TM 
ChangeTLCF -1.580*** -1.411*** -1.837*** 
 (0.384) (0.513) (0.598) 
ChangeTLCF#Delta25000 -0.030 -0.160 0.192 
 (0.386) (0.518) (0.590) 
ChangeTLCF#Delta60000 0.127 -0.480 0.976* 
 (0.401) (0.558) (0.593) 
ChangeTLCF#Delta200000 0.741** 0.140 1.642*** 
 (0.372) (0.482) (0.604) 
ChangeTD -0.818*** -0.635* -1.085*** 
 (0.253) (0.341) (0.384) 
Symmetry -0.237 -0.271 -0.190 
 (0.198) (0.217) (0.374) 
Male 0.078 0.151 0.088 
 (0.160) (0.174) (0.336) 
Age -0.011 -0.002 -0.019 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.023) 
ProfExp -0.004 -0.019 0.016 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.026) 
CRT 0.082 0.083 0.050 
 (0.069) (0.077) (0.118) 
Constant 1.290*** 1.083 1.383* 
  (0.475) (0.680) (0.723) 
Observations 821 485 336 
Pseudo R² 0.059 0.071 0.067 
Note: This table presents additional regression results for the effect of professional 
experience. We estimate a modified version of the logistic regression specified under 
Equation (6) and report regression coefficients. The regressions in all columns include 
the professional sample. The regression in column 2 (3) includes professionals that 
hold a junior (senior) position. Tax-Minimizing (TM) is the dependent variable and 
takes the value of one if individual j makes a tax-minimizing decision in item i. We 
estimate robust standard errors clustered on the individual-level (provided in 
parentheses). *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively (two-tailed).   
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Table 6 
Regression Results for Experiments III and IV 
 (1) (2) 











Variables TM TM 
ChangeTLCF -1.193*** -0.719** 
 (0.383) (0.306) 
ChangeTD -0.644** -0.719** 
 (0.319) (0.285) 
Male -0.089 0.175 
 (0.269) (0.228) 
Age -0.007 -0.025 
 (0.046) (0.020) 
Education 0.502 -0.026 
 (0.414) (0.372) 
WorkExp 0.400 0.046 
 (0.267) (0.277) 
CRT 0.050 0.172* 
 (0.116) (0.100) 
Constant 0.931 0.975 
  (1.087) (0.634) 
Observations 368 502 
Pseudo R² 0.049 0.030 
Note: This table presents the regression results for Experiments 
III and IV. We estimate the logistic regression specified under 
Equation (6) and report regression coefficients. The regression in 
column 1 includes observations from the changed-tax-parameter 
sample and in column 2 from the changed-order sample. Tax-
Minimizing (TM) is the dependent variable and takes the value of 
one if individual j makes a tax-minimizing decision in item i. We 
estimate robust standard errors clustered on the individual-level 
(provided in parentheses). *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed).  
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Table 7 
Regression Results for Robustness Tests (Student and Professional Sample) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) 














Variables TM TM TM TM TM TM 
ChangeTLCF -1.066** -1.036*** -0.952*** -2.240*** -1.407*** -1.142*** 
 (0.524) (0.239) (0.229) (0.666) (0.279) (0.259) 
ChangeTD -0.623 -0.657*** -0.695*** -0.739 -0.800*** -0.745*** 
 (0.476) (0.190) (0.181) (0.547) (0.237) (0.209) 
Symmetry -0.253 -0.125 -0.201 -0.739 -0.239 -0.368** 
 (0.334) (0.152) (0.154) (0.534) (0.186) (0.165) 
Male 0.034 0.267** 0.316* -0.203 0.129 0.283* 
 (0.248) (0.125) (0.171) (0.270) (0.155) (0.164) 
Age -0.041 0.005 0.012 0.053 -0.004 -0.025** 
 (0.037) (0.010) (0.011) (0.071) (0.016) (0.012) 
Education 0.062 0.128 0.070    
 (0.244) (0.171) (0.240)    
WorkExp 0.290 0.015 -0.078    
 (0.311) (0.158) (0.227)    
ProfExp     -0.061 -0.012 0.008 
     (0.072) (0.015) (0.011) 
CRT 0.026 0.051 -0.020 -0.088 0.028 0.075 
 (0.122) (0.055) (0.086) (0.143) (0.068) (0.067) 
Constant 1.772* 0.460* 0.008 0.240 1.192** 1.094*** 
  (0.922) (0.268) (0.358) (1.945) (0.483) (0.351) 
Observations 368 1,400 1,312 192 908 992 
Pseudo R² 0.036 0.035 0.030 0.111 0.056 0.040 
Note: This table presents the regression results for robustness tests based on modified samples of the time-
constraints treatment of the student sample and the professional sample. We estimate the logistic regression 
specified under Equation (6) and report regression coefficients. The regressions in columns 1 and 3 exclude 
individuals with missing observations. The regressions in column 2 and 4 include individuals that did not 
correctly answer the check questions. The regressions in column 3 and 6 treat missing observations for the 
dependent variable (i.e., unanswered items) as suboptimal decisions. Tax-Minimizing (TM) is the dependent 
variable and takes the value of one if individual j makes a tax-minimizing decision in item i. We estimate robust 
standard errors clustered on the individual-level (provided in parentheses). *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed).   
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